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Our economy is becoming increasingly digital. Use of data is driving innovation and
boosting productivity. This government is committed to harnessing the power of
responsible data use, enhancing growth, and ensuring that data works for everyone —
this was set out in the National Data Strategy.
Digital use of personal identity information can be part of this journey. If someone wants
to prove who they are when starting a job, moving house, or transacting online, they
ought to have the tools do so quickly and securely in a digital manner, as an option
alongside using the physical documents we are most familiar with.
Too often, people in the UK have to use a combination of paper documents issued by
government, local authorities and the private sector - and a mixture of offline and online
routes - when they need to prove something about themselves. And they have to repeat
the process for each new transaction.
Online authentication, identity and eligibility solutions can increase security, ease of
use and accessibility to public services. They are central to transforming the delivery
and efficiency of public services and people’s ability to operate confidently in an
increasingly digital economy. It is estimated that widespread use of digital identity
products would be worth around £800m per year to the UK economy. Widespread use
of digital identity products could also help to reduce the record levels of abuse of
personal data and impersonation to commit fraud in the UK, with over 220,000 cases
reported in 2019.
The government is committed to realising the benefits of digital identity, without
creating ID cards. Earlier this year we published a draft of the UK digital identity and
attributes trust framework. This document sets out what rules and standards are
needed to protect people’s sensitive identity data when used digitally. We will put in
place the necessary framework and tools so that digital identity products enhance
privacy, transparency, confidence and inclusion, and that users are able to control their
data, in line with the principles published in the 2019 Call for Evidence response. We
are also developing and piloting a new ‘One Login for Government’ system that will
make it easier for everyone to access government services, with users only having to
provide data to prove their identity once, and protecting privacy throughout.
It’s vital that we move quickly to keep pace with our international partners. We want
people to be able to interact securely across borders and we want to ensure our
businesses can compete globally; enabling the use of secure digital identity products is
key to these ambitions.
We promised to follow up on other aspects of our Digital Identity Call for Evidence at
pace, and this consultation does that now, seeking views on three key issues.
Firstly, to support the trust framework there will need to be a responsible and trusted
governance system in place which can oversee digital identity and attribute use and
make sure organisations comply with the rules contained within the trust framework.
We are using this consultation to solicit views on the exact scope and remit of this
governing body. As the consultation makes clear, it will be vital to ensure that this body
works closely with other regulators that have oversight of digital services, and supports
our wider goals of establishing a coherent regulatory landscape that unlocks innovation
and growth.
Secondly, to unlock the benefits digital identities can bring, we need to make it
possible to digitally check authoritative government-held data. We need the digital
equivalent of checking data sources such as a passport. That’s why we are also
consulting on how to allow trusted organisations to make these checks.
Finally, we want to firmly establish the legal validity of digital identities and attributes,
to build confidence that they can be as good as the physical proofs of identity with
which we are familiar.
We continue to work in an open and transparent way, building on the feedback we
receive. Industry, civil society, international and academic stakeholders have been vital
to the creation of this consultation, and the trust framework. For these tools to deliver
the economic, security and privacy benefits for the UK, they need to be trusted - by
business, by regulators and most importantly by people. That is why it is so important
we get this right. We look forward to hearing your views on these latest proposals.
Matt Warman
Minister for Digital Infrastructure, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport
Julia Lopez
Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office
How to respond to this consultation
You can respond to this consultation via the online survey.
The online survey allows respondents to save a draft response and return to the survey
later. Using the online survey greatly assists in our analysis of the responses, enabling
more efficient and effective consideration of the issues raised for each question.
A summary of questions asked in the consultation can be found at the bottom of this
document.
The consultation and online survey will last for eight weeks, opening on Monday 19 July
and closing at 11:45 PM on Monday 13 September.
For enquiries about responding to the survey, please contact digital-identity-
consultation@dcms.gov.uk. You can also read the the privacy notice associated with
this consultation.
1. Introduction
1.0.0.1 When you want to prove something about yourself — your age, your nationality,
or who you are — you may instinctively turn to a government issued identity document
such as a passport. These physical documents are issued following extensive checks
and identity checking processes are centred on them.
1.0.0.2 However, by being physical documents they are inherently limited. If you are
required to send your passport in the post it could get lost, or you may incur costs to
send it via special delivery. If you need to scan a document, the image may be blurry or
not of the appropriate file size. You may not keep certificates proving your qualifications
to hand.
1.0.0.3 Current identity checking methods can also be costly for business. It takes time
and effort to process these documents manually.
1.0.0.4 Digital access to the attributes these documents contain can solve these
issues. It can also have benefits such as improving inclusion. If you do not have a
passport, perhaps another government service can validate your age. There are also
opportunities for data minimisation by disclosing only that information which is required
(for example, that you’re over 18), rather than full disclosure of your data, including your
date of birth, name, or address.
1.0.0.5 This consultation sets out our policy aims and where we think legislation can
help grow digital identity and attribute use in line with the government’s principles
developed from the Call for Evidence.
A principles-based approach to digital identity and attributes
1) Privacy - When personal data is accessed people should have confidence that there are measures in
place to ensure their confidentiality and privacy; for instance, a supermarket checking a shopper’s age, a
lawyer overseeing the sale of a house or someone applying to take out a loan.
2) Transparency - When an individual’s identity data is checked through use of digital identity and
attribute products, they must be able to understand what was checked, by who, why and when; for
example, being able to see how your bank uses your data through digital identity solutions.
3) Inclusivity - People who want or need a digital identity should be able to obtain one; for example, not
having documentation such as a passport or driving licence should not be a barrier to having a digital
identity.
4) Interoperability - There needs to be agreed technical and operating standards across the UK’s
economy to define what good quality digital identity products look like.
5) Proportionality - User needs and other considerations such as privacy and security should be balanced
so digital identity can be used with confidence across the economy.
6) Good governance - Digital identity and attribute standards should be linked to government policy and
law. Any future regulation will be clear, coherent and align with the government’s wider strategic approach
to digital regulation. For example, firms verifying your identity will need to comply with laws around how
they access and store data.
1.1 Background
1.1.0.1 In 2019 the government opened a Call for Evidence seeking views on how digital
identity could support individuals to prove things about themselves digitally where they
usually relied on paper processes. The overwhelming majority of responses supported
increasing the use of digital identity across the economy.
1.1.0.2 Respondents identified several benefits including increased service options,
greater security and the ability to prove entitlement or eligibility in a privacy friendly
way.
1.1.0.3 The Government’s formal response to the Call for Evidence, published in
September 2020 outlined several areas where government leadership could enable
businesses and individuals across the economy to use digital identities securely and
with more confidence.
1.1.0.4 As part of our commitment to growing digital identity and attribute use across
the economy, we are running a pilot to test how to unlock government held data in a
privacy friendly way.
The Document Checking Service (DCS) Pilot, a joint initiative between the
Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, the Government Digital
Service and HM Passport Office, allows non-public sector organisations to
check if a British passport is valid or not. The pilot was set up to:
test the industry demand for checking information given by a user against
government-held data sources
understand the different ways that organisations could use digital passport
checks
test the technical design that would make these checks possible
capture consumer interest and experience of these checks, and perception of
this use of passport data
understand if this is commercially viable, for the government and the
organisations taking part
The pilot allows participating organisations to send a user’s passport details —
with the user’s consent — to the DCS and receive back a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response,
depending on if the passport is valid or not. No organisations are given direct
access to government-held data. Participating organisations had to undergo a
rigorous application process and must make checks for the purpose of reducing
crime.
1.1.0.5 In February 2021 a first, draft version of the UK digital identity and attributes
trust framework was published. The trust framework is a set of requirements for
creating good quality digital identity products which ensure people’s data and privacy
are protected. An update to the document will be published soon and will contain/has
been published and contains details on certification, among other updates.
The trust framework is designed to be an evolving set of requirements to build
and maintain trust in digital identities in the UK, and to support an ambition for
UK digital identities to be trusted overseas in the future. The development
process for the trust framework included researching other international efforts
to develop and deliver digital identity models and frameworks in both the public
and private sector.
We have liaised with international teams across the UK government including
foreign affairs, economic, finance, and trade teams, and engaged with other
governments and international partners. DCMS continues to research and
benchmark the development of its digital identity policy and strategy against
broader international efforts as we iterate the trust framework, governance
framework and legislative model.
1.2 Proposal
1.2.0.1 Private sector digital identity providers already exist and individuals interact with
digital identity in lots of formats already, such as when logging into online banking.
However, for products to be useful across a range of services, organisations need a
digital way to check the attributes held in authoritative government-held data for
eligibility and identity purposes.
An attribute is a piece of information that describes something about a person
or an organisation.
‘George has passed his driving test’ is an attribute of George
An eligibility check asks whether a particular person or organisation has a
particular attribute.
Is this person over eighteen years old? Calculated from ‘date of birth’
attribute
Is this person eligible to drive? Answered by ‘passed driving test’ attribute
An identity check asks who a person or organisation is.
Are you this particular natural or legal person? Determined to an agreed level
of assurance from a variety of attributes
Examples
When buying alcohol you only need to undergo an eligibility check. What
matters is that you are over eighteen — who you are is immaterial.
When opening a bank account, however, you will need to undergo eligibility
checks — are you of sufficient age, for example — as well as an identity
check.
1.2.0.2 Digital checking will reduce friction in transactions, and speed up instances
where eligibility or identity is checked via paper certification, such as during the home
buying process. The current home buying process can be delayed due to the need to
prove identity multiple times, potentially to different standards. It also requires
individuals to pay fees to have documents like a passport officially certified.
1.2.0.3 Access to government-held data is just one part of realising the benefits from
digital identity for individuals and organisations. We also need to ensure there are
robust and standardised protections for privacy, for security, and to build confidence in
digital identity and attribute products. We are doing this both via the trust framework
and also in our vision for a governing body which will continue to set standards as
technology changes.
1.2.0.4 This consultation explains our thinking on the legislative measures and policy
interventions needed to create an enabling digital identity and attributes framework in
the UK. It has three parts:
1.2.1 Creating a digital identity governance framework
1.2.1.1 This section describes a possible model of governance which will meet the needs
of all parties. The aim of the proposal is to balance proportionate regulation with
security, consumer protection and trust, according to the scale of digital identity use.
1.2.2 Enabling a legal gateway between public and private sector organisations for
data checking
1.2.2.1 This section sets out our intent for a permissive legal power to allow digital
identities in the UK to be built on a greater range of trusted datasets and for
government-held attributes to be checked for eligibility, identity, and validation
purposes. Organisations making such checks must have a correct lawful basis under
the UK General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) to do so.
1.2.3 Establishing the validity of digital identities and attributes
1.2.3.1 This section proposes how we could build confidence in the legal validity of
digital identities and attributes alongside the physical proofs of identity that businesses
and individuals already trust, as part of our commitment to increase choice and
confidence.
1.2.3.2 We welcome your feedback on this consultation exercise.
2. Creating a digital identity governance
framework
2.0.0.1 The government is committed to creating a clear legal framework for digital
identity and attribute use that enables businesses to innovate and allows people to
access the goods and services they want with ease. Effective governance will build a
trusted ecosystem for the safe use of digital identities across the economy and, through
that trust, will drive innovation and growth in the UK economy. Good governance will
ensure the digital identity and attribute principles are upheld.
2.0.0.2 For these reasons we are proposing the following high level objectives for
governance
1. Create value in a manner that is proportionally beneficial to all stakeholders
2. Foster innovation by ensuring that requirements are proportionate to enable
market entry and growth
3. Enable interoperability to ensure optimal outcomes from the perspective of
the end-user/data subject
4. Enable inclusion by promoting inclusive and accessible solutions especially
for end-users
5. Maximise trust by ensuring personal data privacy through adherence to
required standards
6. Carry out the above objectives in a way that is both financially and
functionally sustainable.
2.0.0.3 The governance framework we envisage will create regulatory functions within
an existing regulator and will need to be set out in legislation. Placing these functions
within an existing regulator ensures the regulator has the experience, status and
powers to give sufficient oversight and offers economies of scale by reducing costs
associated with setting up a brand new stand-alone regulator.
2.0.0.4 We envisage a tiered system wherein individual organisations can be part of this
governance framework by being certified against the trust framework or they can join as
part of a sector-specific scheme. The role of schemes was first set out in the draft
version of the trust framework. We will be asking questions throughout this
consultation about what responsibilities should be delegated to the operators of these
schemes.
2.0.0.5 We want the governing body to do the following, however there are different
ways these could be achieved, and we will ask questions about this in subsequent
sections:
Ongoing management of the trust framework. The governing body will run the trust
framework and update its requirements to ensure they remain fit for purpose as
technology evolves.
Set up and provide oversight of accreditation and certification processes so
qualifying organisations prove compliance with a trust mark. Organisations will
need to prove that they are trustworthy and capable, and do this by demonstrating
that they abide by the trust framework requirements. The governing body will set up a
certification framework and appoint an authority to accredit certifying bodies who
will then assess and certify participants of the trust framework.
Monitor compliance and performance. Auditor’s working for accredited
certification bodies will monitor organisations’ and schemes’ compliance to the
requirements of the trust framework, reporting into the governing body. The
governing body will need to monitor the performance of the certification framework.
Oversee member organisations and the management of schemes. The governing
body will need to oversee individual member organisations and scheme owners to
ensure both are maintaining the standards of the trust framework.
Promote consumer protection by managing enforcement, complaints, and
redress. If something goes wrong which can’t be resolved either within the scheme
or organisation’s usual complaints processes or by contract law — or if a trust
framework member does not follow the specified requirements — then the governing
body will intervene, and in serious cases remove the trust mark. Where an issue is
covered by existing regulatory duties the body may operate a triage function and
signpost organisations and citizens to other regulators as appropriate.
Collaborate with stakeholders and other regulators. The governing body will need
to collaborate with cross-sector and industry regulators; national and international
bodies; security and fraud groups; privacy groups; and government departments.
Maximise cybersecurity and minimise fraud. The governing body will use
requirements in the trust framework and collaboration with law enforcement and
regulators to maximise cybersecurity and minimise fraud. It will work with trust
framework participants to increase the prevention of incidents and promote swift
action to tackle suspicious activity.
Promote and encourage inclusion. The governing body will aim to ensure that the
activities within the UK’s digital identity ecosystem promote inclusivity by building
additional inclusion considerations into the trust framework and its certification
processes, and act if it identifies certain groups being excluded from digital activities
or services without justification.
Digital identity governance framework
2.1 The governing body
2.1.0.1 We are seeking views in this consultation on which regulator should house the
governing body for digital identity as no decision has yet been made. Consultation
responses will help inform that decision.
2.1.0.2 We believe that there is benefit to empowering a single regulator to undertake
all of the governance functions outlined above. To split the functions between bodies
would complicate the regulatory landscape and confuse people and organisations as to
who they should go to. Any regulator which is to take on the governance functions
should already carry out some of the required regulatory functions outlined below.
2.1.0.3 Housing these functions within an existing regulator would also avoid the steep
costs associated with creating a new regulator, providing value to the taxpayer, and
allow for greater flexibility as the digital identity market grows.
2.1.0.4 To ensure the governing body is transparent it will be required to publish reports
on its progress and actions and on the performance of the digital identity market
against the trust framework rules and standards, and may be commissioned by the
government to produce one-off reports in areas of interest.
2.1.0.5 This regulator will of course need to collaborate with other relevant regulators,
such as the FCA and Ofcom, and agree regulatory practices with other industry
regulators who use digital identities within their sectors. The government is currently
exploring how they can support and strengthen collaboration between the key digital
regulators to address such interactions, building on evidence recently supplied by the
Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum.
2.1.0.6 Digital identity governance will need to operate across the economy as well as
be used within sector based industries, such as financial services or home buying &
conveyancing. Pan-economy harms regulators can operate across the economy to
enforce measures which protect citizens and mitigate harms. Examples of regulators
like this include the Information Commissioner’s Office, the Competition and Markets
Authority and the Equalities and Human Rights Commission. Sector focused regulators
operate in specific areas of the economy or areas of activity, examples of this are the
Planning Inspectorate, the Health and Safety Executive and the new Digital Markets
Unit (DMU) which will be created within the CMA to operationalise the future pro-
competition regime for digital markets.
2.1.0.7 As the programme of reform is delivered, appropriate government approval
processes, including in relation to arm’s-length bodies, will be followed.
1. Do you agree an existing regulator is best placed to house digital identity
governance, or should a new body be created?
2. Which regulator do you think should house digital identity governance?
3. What is your opinion on the governance functions we have identified as being
required: is anything missed or not needed, in your view?
2.2 Trust framework, standards and rules management
2.2.0.1 In February 2021 DCMS published a first, draft version of the UK digital identity
and attribute trust framework. Its second draft has been published/will be published
and contains details on the certification process, among other updates. The trust
framework, once finalised, will lay out a set of requirements organisations must follow
in order to join. The framework includes requirements on areas such as:
creating and using digital identities
how organisations should handle and protect personal data
what security and encryption standards must be followed
how user accounts should be managed
how to protect against fraud and misuse
2.2.1 Setting standards and legal requirements
2.2.1.1 As our digital world continues to evolve we expect that the requirements within
the trust framework will need periodic refreshing and updating to ensure they keep
pace with external changes, trends, and technical and service innovation. The need for
this to be reactive and flexible means we do not propose to enshrine these
requirements directly in legislation. Instead we propose that the governing body is
given a legal responsibility to own and run the trust framework and any associated
guidance incorporated into it.
2.2.1.2 We also propose that related government-owned guidance, including Good
Practice Guide (GPG) 44 and GPG 45, should be fully incorporated into the trust
framework.
2.2.1.3 We propose that updates to standards, requirements or associated guidance
will not necessarily need to be made by the governing body itself. The governing body
may arrange for the updates to be made by others, whilst remaining in overall oversight
and ownership.
4.What is your opinion on the governing body owning the trust framework as
outlined, and does the identity of the governing body affect your opinion?
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2.2.2 Scope of the trust framework
2.2.2.1 Governance will only apply to those operating within the trust framework, and
membership of the trust framework will be voluntary. However, only organisations with
accredited certification against the trust framework will be granted permission to use a
trust mark to prove their product or service meets government-recognised
requirements for digital identity.
2.2.2.2 In section 3.1, we also propose that certification against the trust framework
should be a requirement before organisations make checks against government-held
data through the proposed legal gateway.
2.2.3 Collaboration with interested parties
2.2.3.1 As mentioned, the governing body will also need to update and refresh the trust
framework as technology and security practices change. We envisage the governing
body managing this process, even if the technicalities of such a refresh are delegated.
We also expect the governing body to consult with interested parties, regulators, and
advisory groups, including the government itself, on any updates to standards.
2.2.3.2 To ensure that the rules and standards outlined in the trust framework remain
relevant, up to date, and in line with international standards, we envisage the governing
body will set up advisory groups to help support it in its role; these groups will advise
the regulator at senior executive or board level and may include representation from
industry, scheme owners, privacy, civil society and consumer groups. These advisory
groups will be in addition to any consultations on updates to the trust framework and
its requirements.
6.How do we fairly represent the interests of civil society and public and private
sectors when refreshing trust framework requirements?
7.Are there any other advisory groups that should be set up in addition to those
suggested?
2.3 Accreditation & certification
Accreditation is the formal recognition by an independent body that a
certification body operates according to recognised standards. Accreditation
demonstrates to the marketplace that certification bodies are technically
competent to audit and certify activity in accordance with the requirements of
national and international standards and regulations.
Certification is the provision by an independent, accredited body of written
assurance (a certificate) that the product, service or system in question meets
specific requirements. The independent assurance is undertaken by an
accredited certification body.
2.3.0.1 There needs to be a robust means for organisations to prove that they follow the
rules and standards as set out in the trust framework, and thus can be trusted by
people. Accredited certification is the standard way to achieve this. In the context of
the trust framework, accredited certification means that an organisation has been
independently assessed as meeting the requirements set out in the trust framework.
Digital identity certification framework
2.3.0.2 We are planning for the governing body to own this certification framework. We
are also planning to appoint the UK Accreditation Service (UKAS) to accredit certifying
bodies using ISO 17065:2012 (Conformity assessment — Requirements for bodies
certifying products, processes and services) to manage the certification process. UKAS
will set out an open application process through which interested certification bodies
can apply in due course.
2.3.0.3 We will soon publish further details about certification in an update to the trust
framework and assess the approach through robust testing.
2.3.1 Trust mark and trusted list
2.3.1.1 Upon successful certification, the governing body will award a ‘trust mark’ to
certified scheme owners , scheme members and individual organisations. This trust
mark will signify to members of the public and other organisations that products and
services which display the trust mark have been audited to confirm they follow the trust
framework requirements.
2.3.1.2 The governing body will also be required to publish a register of trust framework
participants showing the certification status, any membership of scheme(s), and when
the trust mark was awarded. The register will be kept up to date, available on the
governing body’s website, and be available to anyone who wants to view it. This register
would be particularly useful for consumer protection purposes by allowing relying
parties and citizens to assure themselves of valid trust framework membership and
trust mark status, similar to that for Qualified Trust Service Providers under the UK
eIDAS Regulations. Under these Regulations a list is published and maintained of
qualified trust service providers who are organisations providing qualified trust services
and that have been granted qualified status by the ICO.
2.3.2 Fees and funding
2.3.2.1 The governing body will also be empowered to collect fees from trust framework
members and scheme owners to support and go towards covering the costs of its
functions. There could be a one-off entrance fee for first joining the trust framework,
and/or an ongoing annual membership fee. The costs behind this are still being
considered.
1. How should the government ensure that any fees do not become a barrier to
entry for organisations while maintaining value for money for the taxpayer?
2.4 Monitoring compliance & performance
2.4.0.1 To ensure organisations and schemes are meeting the trust framework
requirements, the governing body will have the legal responsibility for confirming their
continued compliance post-certification. The governing body will need to oversee and
manage a monitoring system for trust framework members. This will assess continued
adherence of organisations and schemes to the trust framework.
2.4.0.2 In line with the standard approach to certification elsewhere, we believe that
the governing body should delegate the operational aspects of this power to accredited
certification bodies employing suitably qualified certified auditors, accredited as set
out in the previous section. This choice will lower the time investment required for the
governing body while also allowing for high quality monitoring. To maintain an
appropriate level of oversight, the governing body will put in place reporting
arrangements with the certification bodies to ensure it is kept abreast of high level
information about certification body activities.
2.4.0.3 Costs for these audits will be borne by the trust framework organisation being
audited through a contractual relationship with their chosen certification body. This is
in addition to any fees paid directly to the governing body to join the framework.
2.5 Oversight/Management of organisations/schemes
Information about schemes
Organisations can use the UK digital identity and attributes trust framework:
by themselves as a single organisation
as part of a ‘scheme’
A scheme is made up of different organisations who agree to follow a specific
set of rules around the use of digital identities and attributes. These
organisations might work in the same sector, industry or region, which means
they will build products and services for similar types of users. A scheme can
help organisations work together more effectively by making it easier for them
to share information. They can do this by adding additional requirements to the
rules of the trust framework which will only be applicable to that scheme.
A scheme is created and run by a scheme owner. The scheme owner sets the
rules of the scheme. This is known as a ‘scheme specification’ and must be
based on the rules of the trust framework. It could include:
what roles are available in the scheme
how members should work together
how members should process data about their users
how members can work to create interoperability between schemes
There are a number of schemes currently in development in the UK. These will
operate in a range of sectors like financial services, the employment sector, and
age verification amongst others.
2.5.0.1 We envisage that the governing body will take a two-layered approach to
governance. We expect that scheme owners will provide governance of their scheme
and solve any internal problems which arise. The governing body will then oversee these
scheme owners to ensure their role is performed satisfactorily. If the scheme owner
cannot provide a resolution then the issue will be escalated to the governing body. The
governing body will also oversee directly any individual organisations who are not part
of a scheme, ensuring their compliance with the trust framework. This two-layered
approach will ensure the governance model can react flexibly to the market developing.
Allowing organisations to join both directly and via a scheme will enable the market to
develop at pace and best meet the needs of those using the trust framework. The
approach will be kept under review as the ecosystem matures.
How oversight of the scheme will work
2.5.0.2 Through its role in certification and awarding of the trust mark, the governing
body will have approval over scheme creation by certifying scheme owners. Depending
on the nature and maturity of a scheme, and developing policy around the trust
framework, a scheme may also become accredited in its own right through developing
an accredited certification scheme.
9.Do you agree with this two-layered approach to oversight where oversight is
provided by the governing body and scheme owners?
2.5.0.3 The governing body will have responsibility for the safe growth and
development of the digital identity ecosystem. However, the presence of schemes and
scheme owners may affect how the governing body oversees organisations. The
governing body will need to ensure that there are no compromises to how the trust
framework requirements are being met by industry, but some responsibility for
certification and monitoring may sit with the scheme owner. The governing body will
have responsibility for ensuring scheme owners and schemes are complying with the
standards and principles of the trust framework.
2.6 Complaints, redress and enforcement
2.6.0.1 The UK government will empower the governing body to ensure that the right
rules and processes are in place to limit instances in which things go wrong and to
maintain the security of the digital identity ecosystem. But it would be unrealistic to
expect to completely eliminate the risk of criminal activity or the misguided actions of
individual organisations.
2.6.0.2 This section looks at what should happen when things do go wrong.
2.6.0.3 For example, an identity or attribute service provider could provide inaccurate
data due to issues in how the provider has captured a person’s data or linked (bound) it
to that person. An attribute service provider may have breached the trust framework
rules by not checking when the data was last updated before providing it. This
inaccuracy may cause that person to be denied access to a relying service through no
fault of their own.
2.6.0.4 Identity or attribute service providers could also fail to implement appropriate
security measures, leading to a third party gaining unauthorised access to personal
data. Such breaches could cause significant harm or distress to the people whose data
has been exposed.
2.6.1 Complaints
2.6.1.1 As with all responsible service providers, trust framework organisations should
have a clear route for individuals to make a complaint if things go wrong. The
complaints process should respond swiftly and diligently to requests on areas such as
data rectification. Indeed, there is already a statutory requirement to respond to a
request for rectification within one calendar month under data protection legislation,
with possible extensions if the request is complex or multiple requests have been
received.
2.6.1.2 Where there is a scheme under the trust framework, it is expected the scheme
owner should put in place their own complaints and resolution process to provide
redress for individuals, either in addition to or instead of what is done at the level of
individual organisations.
2.6.1.3 However, it is recognised that as the governing body is responsible for ensuring
trust in the framework, there needs to be an option to escalate a complaint when it has
not been satisfactorily resolved, or when the complaint involves multiple actors within
the trust framework. To give both individuals and organisations transparency, there will
need to be clear rules to define what qualifies as a complaint which can be escalated
and what the possible outcomes will be if it is upheld. These details will be worked
through once the policy to redress and enforcement have been finalised post-outcome
of the consultation.
2.6.1.4 To reduce burden on the governing body, proof will likely be required that
resolution has been sought through lower-level governance processes first. The
governing body will also need to be able to gain access to the information it needs to
investigate who is in the wrong when such complaints are made.
10.Do you agree the governing body should be an escalation point for
complaints which cannot be resolved at organisational or scheme level?
2.6.1.5 If a complaint is upheld, the governing body will need to take appropriate action
related to redress and enforcement, as detailed below.
2.6.2 Redress for individuals
2.6.2.1 Redress for individuals refers to the process by which individuals can seek
compensation, through a claim, for a harm that has been inflicted upon them by one of
the actors in the digital identity ecosystem.
2.6.2.2 When something goes wrong and a trust framework organisation is at fault, it is
likely to be covered by the UK General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) and Data
Protection Act 2018 in the majority of circumstances. We therefore do not plan on
creating any new offences relating to digital identity.
2.6.2.3 Outside of new offences, there is still a case for considering additional redress
routes for consumers in a digital identity context - although given the close links to data
protection, they would need to be cautiously implemented or risk creating confusion for
consumers. At the moment, an individual can make a complaint to the Information
Commissioner’s Office (ICO) when they think their data has been misused. The ICO may
take enforcement action but individuals will not receive any financial compensation
without going through the courts. It should be noted that whichever regulator is
selected as the governing body for digital identity, their complaints process will need to
have a clear relationship to the ICO’s existing complaints process. This will be worked
through once a regulator has been chosen.
2.6.2.4 We recognised that if something goes wrong with a digital identity, it has the
potential to cause more harm than the misuse of data in other contexts. For example, it
could prevent access to a critical service or block an important transaction. There is
also the psychological impact of having identity-related data misused. An easier route
to financial compensation could therefore be justified when a trust framework
organisation has broken the rules and significant harm has been caused.
2.6.2.5 One option for implementing this is for organisations to be compelled to
provide compensation to individuals under certain circumstances when responding to
an escalated complaint. Depending on the existing set-up of the selected regulator, it
could take the form of an ombudsman-like service provided in-house by the governing
body, or through a relationship between the governing body and an independent
ombudsman.
Example: Financial Ombudsman Service
The Financial Ombudsman Service is a free (for consumers) and easy-to-use
service that settles complaints between consumers and businesses that
provide financial services. They aim to resolve disputes fairly and impartially.
If a financial business and a customer can’t resolve a complaint themselves,
they will give an unbiased answer about what has happened. If they decide
someone has been treated unfairly, they will use legal powers to put things
right.
All businesses that are covered by the service and are regulated by the Financial
Conduct Authority pay an annual levy to contribute to their costs. Businesses
may also have to pay an individual case fee when they handle a complaint about
them.
2.6.2.6 An alternative is for industry to set up its own dispute resolution mechanism(s).
This could take the form of optional but encouraged schemes for industry to set up on
their own terms; an analogous example being the Removal Industry Ombudsman
Scheme, which provides participating members with an independent dispute resolution
service if their own procedures fail. A more interventionist approach could be to
mandate trust framework organisations to join an industry-led scheme, with the
governing body approving the terms of such schemes. An existing example of this is the
requirement in the Housing Act 2004 for landlords and letting agents on assured
shorthold tenancies to use a government-approved tenancy deposit scheme.
Example: ATOL protection
Air Travel Organiser’s Licence, more commonly known as ATOL, is a UK financial
protection scheme covering most air package holidays. The scheme is run by
the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA).
The scheme exists to protect consumers if their travel organiser ceases trading,
helping those already abroad minimise disruption to their holiday and providing
compensation to those who have not yet travelled.
Travel businesses demonstrate they are covered by the ATOL scheme by
displaying the ATOL logo on their website alongside their unique license
number. The CAA also maintains a searchable list of ATOL holders — containing
business name, website, and license number — so consumers can verify the
authenticity of the logo.
Compensation is funded by the Air Travel Trust Fund, which in turn is funded by
ATOL Protection Contributions. This is a charge of £2.50 per passenger,
payable by ATOL holders, not passengers themselves.
2.6.2.7 A third approach would be for the trust framework to include contract terms for
trust framework organisations to include in their terms and conditions (T&Cs) with
consumers. These could be mandated T&Cs or, more flexibly, principles for contract
terms. The latter could be supplemented with standard T&Cs to make it easier for
organisations to implement, in a similar way to standard contractual clauses in data
protection. Such T&Cs could include a commitment to pay compensation to consumers
under certain defined scenarios, or a broader principles-based requirement to provide
effective redress. This option could offer a quicker means to redress than a dispute
resolution mechanism which will involve intermediary organisations.
2.6.2.8 Lastly, the governing body could reserve the right to impose one of these
options at a later date when digital identity solutions become more advanced and used
at scale. This would give us the opportunity to more fully assess the harm consumers
may face in future and ensure the right course of action is taken. To ensure this is
considered in good time, we could legislate for a full review to take place by a certain
date.
2.6.2.9 Any additional redress routes need to be carefully considered. The trust
framework will not be mandatory and relies on organisations recognising the value of
joining. Too much risk and burden for organisations will result in reduced uptake and the
redress routes won’t apply. Consumers will also fail to benefit from the security-centred
requirements of the trust framework if organisations choose to not participate.
Therefore intervention must meet a clear and well-defined need.
11.Do you think there needs to be additional redress routes for consumers using
products under the trust framework?
If yes, which one or more of the following?:
an ombudsman service
industry-led dispute resolution mechanism (encouraged or mandated)
set contract terms between organisations and consumers
something else
If no, do you think the governing body should reserve the right to impose an
additional route once the ecosystem is more fully developed?
2.6.2.10 We believe that, where there are redress pathways in existing regulators, the
governing body should act to signpost organisations and individuals to these. This
should be done using agreed mechanisms such as memorandums of understanding to
ascertain where to signpost. This option would reduce costs for the governing body,
lower regulatory burden on organisations, and avoid duplication of regulatory functions.
2.6.2.11 This approach has the advantage of alerting the relevant industry regulator that
there has been an issue and may mean that there is not a need for a large resourced
redress function within the digital identity governing body - although the governing
body will need to triage cases and is likely to occasionally get involved in complex
cases.
2.6.2.12 For example, under data protection legislation a person is able to enforce a
failure by a data controller to comply with their obligations under data protection
legislation by either bringing a complaint to the ICO or through bringing a claim against
the controller directly.
12.Do you see any challenges to this approach of signposting to existing redress
pathways?
2.6.3 Identity repair
2.6.3.1 Aside from financial compensation, the other key means for redress is ‘repairing’
identities quickly and effectively when there are errors. As above, individuals already
have some rights under data protection legislation, which includes the right for
individuals to have their personal data rectified, or completed if incomplete.
Organisations must respond within one calendar month to these requests from
individuals.
2.6.3.2 Under the trust framework, consumers could find this wait time is too long if the
error is preventing service access. Where data is held in multiple sources, it may also
become difficult for consumers to unpick where an error has occurred and who to
contact to get it rectified. We are therefore considering what system-wide options we
have for making it easier for individuals and organisations to maintain data accuracy.
This could include rules and guidance in the trust framework, or governance processes
between trust framework organisations. The options are likely to be separate to the
complaints procedure described above, as they would offer a quicker route to redress
for individuals without the need for escalation.
2.6.3.3 For example, a ‘no wrong door’ policy could mean that organisations could be
required to assist consumers in finding where their data contains errors, rather than
leaving it to the consumer to contact multiple organisations.
13.How should we enhance the ‘right to rectification’ for trust framework
products and services?
2.6.4 Enforcement
2.6.4.1 Following monitoring and oversight, if the governing body finds that members or
schemes are not complying with the rules of the trust framework then it will need to
take punitive action.
2.6.4.2 At a minimum, the governing body should be able to expel or suspend non-
compliant members from the trust framework and remove the trust mark from them.
This may prevent organisations from making future checks against government-held
data until they have been re-certified against the trust framework. The organisation who
has had the trust mark removed will also be compelled to inform customers and clients
of this fact. There may also be requirements to delete all data held which was collected
during the infringement period/all data ever collected, or offer to transfer a customer’s
data to a new provider, depending on the nature and severity of the case and the
customer’s wishes. Other trust framework participants will also be informed of
enforcement measures taken.
Regulating data protection
The Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018) sets out the data protection
framework in the United Kingdom. The act sets out the enforcement tools that
the Information Commissioner’s Office can use to regulate organisations
processing personal data.
The DPA 2018 gives the ICO powers to issue:
Information notices (section 142), which are issued to require an
organisation to provide information to the ICO to assist with investigations.
Assessment notices (section146), which are issued when the ICO wishes to
use additional measures to carry out its responsibilities examples include
entering premises to observe processing or interview staff
Enforcement notices (section 149), which are issued when the ICO is
satisfied that an organisation has failed to meet its compliance obligations.
Penalty notices (section 155), which set out additional penalties including
fines for serious breaches of data protection rules.
Organisations who wish to appeal the issuing of a notice can do so to the first-
tier tribunal.
2.6.4.3 We recognise that these powers need to be proportionate to the level of end-
user risk entailed. If the potential punishment facing companies is too great then it may
disincentive companies who are interested in being involved in the digital identity
market. An additional mechanism that may strike an appropriate balance would be
escalation to other regulators, such as the ICO, the FCA and Ofcom. This could be
established via memorandums of understanding between regulators as necessary.
1. Should the governing body be granted any of the following additional
enforcement powers where there is non-compliance to trust framework
requirements?
Monetary fines
Enforced compensation payments to affected consumers
Restricting processing and/or provision of digital identity services
Issue reprimand notices for minor offences with persistent reprimands
requiring further investigation
1. Should the governing body publish all enforcement action undertaken for
transparency and consumer awareness?
2.7 Security & Fraud
2.7.0.1 A strong and successful digital identity ecosystem offers opportunities to
mitigate against many types of cybercrime and fraud. For example, if a person does not
need to carry a passport to prove their identity then the opportunities for the document
to be lost or stolen are reduced. To minimise digital risks, it is essential that the
governing body should hold accountability for ensuring a robust approach to managing
security and fraud. Part of its responsibilities will include ownership of the trust
framework, which reflects the current best practice for managing all aspects of risks
and security including cyber security and fraud.
2.7.0.2 However, just as digital identity and attribute use can be a tool for increasing
security and minimising identity misuse, it will also inevitably be a target for those with
nefarious intentions and therefore it is essential that the governing body takes
proactive action to limit these activities, over and above detailing requirements and
standards to prevent fraud and crime within the trust framework.
2.7.1 Information sharing
2.7.1.1 We envisage that the governing body hold accountability for implementing
information sharing structures with and between trust framework participants and key
stakeholders to maximise security and minimise fraud. The aim is to enable the
detection and prevention of fraud and security incidents.
2.7.1.2 The work needed to set up effective information sharing structures for this
purpose is significant, but we propose it is essential to developing and maintaining trust
in the ecosystem. Some information sharing initiatives are already in existence, such as
the National Cyber Security Centre’s Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership,
and where appropriate we will look to use these or learn from them. We recognise that
while the governing body may be accountable for ensuring such structures are in place,
it will likely be more appropriate to delegate responsibility for the operational
requirements to another organisation/s.
2.7.1.3 In addition to the information sharing structures with and between trust
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2.7.1.3 In addition to the information sharing structures with and between trust
framework participants, the governing body will engage and collaborate with relevant
bodies across law enforcement, security, government, and industry organisations to
stay up to date with threats and inform trust framework participants as appropriate.
2.7.1.4 We believe this approach will allow the governing body to:
be responsible for ensuring fraud, security, and information assurance best practice
among trust framework members, in addition to the requirements it mandates through
the trust framework facilitate the sharing of fraud, threat, and risk information that
could potentially impact members of the trust framework
16.What framework-level fraud and security management initiatives should be
put in place?
2.8 Inclusion
2.8.0.1 Inclusion is at the heart of our policy making for digital identity. Not everyone
will have a digital identity. This could be from personal choice. Or from digital exclusion,
for example through lack of confidence and digital skills, or not having compatible
devices (e.g. smartphone). Digital identity use will not be mandatory and people will
retain the option to use available paper documentation.
2.8.0.2 Digital identity products will help empower people who may currently find it
difficult to prove something about themselves. For example, if someone can’t afford
traditional identity documents, they may benefit from being able to choose to use a
digital identity product based on other data or on a ‘vouch’ (a declaration from someone
that knows the user), as set out in the trust framework.
2.8.0.3 Multiple user research projects along with extensive conversations with subject
matter experts across government and industry have indicated that an in-person option
for digital identity creation will encourage a more inclusive digital identity market.
Example: In-person digital identity service
The Post Office is expanding its digital identity services. It will allow people to
easily create digital identities face-to-face with a postmaster. This is an example
of how a person with limited digital skills or lack of digital infrastructure will be
able to set up a digital identity, to help them access services more smoothly.
17.How else can we encourage more inclusive digital identities?
2.8.1 Exclusion report
2.8.1.1 We want the governing body to help encourage organisations to be as inclusive
as possible. When live, the trust framework will also have requirements which will
encourage organisations to develop inclusive services. All organisations and schemes
will be required to produce an annual exclusion report as part of being certified against
the trust framework.
2.8.1.2 We recognise that there are many scenarios and situations where despite the
best effort, exclusion is unavoidable. For example, an organisation which only focuses
on scanning passport chips excludes those without a passport, but this exclusion is
justified as being integral to the organisation’s product. If an organisation is unable to
justify why they are excluding certain users, they must outline what they are doing to
mitigate this.
2.8.1.3 Exclusion is easier to measure than inclusion and can describe how and what is
excluded and why. It is possible to determine from a service why something shouldn’t
have been excluded.
2.8.1.4 The exclusion report could include:
Evidence of demographic research or customer analysis, including specific figures
(but no personal data)
Which demographics have been, or are likely to be, excluded from using the
organisation’s product or service and an explanation of why this has happened or
could happen
The option to show extra steps an organisation is taking to improve inclusion and
evidence to support this
2.8.1.5 An exclusion report is not intended as something that has a negative impact on
the view of a service, nor is it intended to create overhead for a participant to produce.
In the main, we would expect that the information provided is something that is readily
available from a participating service’s internal metrics or key performance indicators
(KPIs).
2.8.1.6 There are positive benefits in collecting this information:
It will help the trust framework to improve inclusion over time
It will help us identify if different technologies need to be considered to remove
barriers to inclusion
It helps us to decide if we are asking for the wrong evidence from individuals in a way
which creates barriers to inclusion
It helps us improve the overall digital identity landscape by recognising barriers and
finding ways to break these down
It gives us a way to have some measurement about what areas exclude potential
users of a service
It may help us decide if we need to change the list of people who can vouch for an
individual
2.8.1.7 The governing body will extract data from these reports and share the findings
with government where appropriate. It will also make recommendations for the
improvement of inclusion under the trust framework, working together with scheme
owners. It will identify any failure to meet this requirement. Such failures could result in
enforcement measures taking place, as described above.
18.What are the advantages and disadvantages with this exclusion report
approach?
19.What would you expect the exclusion report to include?
3 Enabling a legal gateway between public
and private sector organisations for data
checking
3.0.0.1 Proving entitlement or service eligibility via paper checks does not transfer
neatly into the digital space. Digital identity and attribute products often require digital
checks to be performed for them to realise their full potential. They can streamline and
speed up processes and help with remote verification.
3.0.0.2 Digital checks enhance people’s privacy. Instead of showing an organisation a
physical document containing a range of personal information, a digital check allows a
person to only disclose what data is strictly necessary to allow access to a given
service.
3.0.0.3 For example, instead of sharing household income, a person can share if their
household income meets the threshold. Instead of sharing their personal address, a
person could share that they live in a certain catchment area.
3.0.0.4 Government-held data is seen as authoritative and so checks made against it
often hold more weight than that from other sources. There are a wide range of data
sets held by the government, and checks against these could enable digital identity
products to be built on a more inclusive footing.
3.0.0.5 We propose creating a legal gateway that will create a power for government
departments and agencies to confirm personal data with organisations for eligibility,
identity or validation checking purposes.
3.0.0.6 This power would not place a requirement on government data holders to allow
checks against the data they hold. It would instead provide them with the power to do
so, if they see fit.
3.1 Protecting privacy and individuals
3.1.0.1 UK data protection rules will provide individuals with protection when identity
attributes are checked. Both parties, government and the organisation making checks,
will need to have a suitable lawful basis for doing so.
3.1.0.2 Additionally, only trusted organisations should be able to request such checks
against government-held data. There needs to be clear governance around any new
legal gateway with industry or we risk damaging public trust. We propose that the trust
framework and supporting certification and governance functions will provide a robust
mechanism for delivering this trust, supported by contractual relationships with the
government. This would also have the advantage of streamlining processes so that
individual government departments do not have to complete their own checks on
organisations to ensure they will handle data securely, alleviating the burden for
government and organisations.
20.Should membership of the trust framework be a prerequisite for an
organisation to make eligibility or identity checks against government-held
data?
3.1.0.3 To further protect privacy, private sector organisations will not have direct
access to government-held datasets and data minimisation practices will be part of any
check. This means that the minimal level of personal information will be provided to
complete the check. A way of doing this was demonstrated in the DCS pilot, as outlined
in the introduction.
3.1.0.4 We intend for digital identity checks to simplify access to services by providing a
quick and easy way to check a person is eligible. However, a service should not be
denied solely on the outcome of a digital government check. That is, someone who is
eligible for a service should not be denied access to it purely on the basis of a digital
check against government-held data; there should be alternative methods for them to
prove their eligibility, if required. These alternative methods may be similar to those
employed today.
21.Should a requirement to allow an alternative pathway for those who fail a
digital check be set out in legislation or by the governing body in standards?
3.2 How data could be checked
3.2.0.1 Our starting position is that attribute checks are best made via so-called
‘yes’/’no’ attribute checking. This is where an organisation requesting a check must
assert a piece of information such as the data subject’s date of birth, then the
government dataholder receiving the request responds ‘yes’ if the date of birth matches
their record and ‘no’ if it does not. This matches the approach taken for the DCS pilot,
as outlined in the introduction.
3.2.0.2 However, there may be cases where this would prevent appropriate checks
being made and stifle innovation. For example, as part of a credit check it is easy to
imagine a person asking HMRC to provide the tax band they have reached — something
which the individual may be confused about if they have held several jobs within one tax
year. This would not be covered by ‘yes’/’no’ attribute checking. Another example may
be to allow ‘fuzzy matching’ for addresses, so if someone mistyped just one part of their
address, the check could indicate a partial match.
3.2.0.3 If other styles of disclosure were allowed, such as those in the examples, we
would still consider ‘yes’/’no’ attribute checking to be best practice to be used in the
majority of cases.
22.Should disclosure be restricted to a “yes/no’’ answer or should we allow
more detailed responses if appropriate?
Codes of Practice
Part 5 of the Digital Economy Act 2017 gives government powers to share
personal information between Government Departments to improve public
services. To ensure that data is shared correctly the Digital Economy Act 2017
established the rules for information sharing in Code of Practices which act as a
practical guide for officials to follow before any information is shared.
3.2.0.4 A code of practice could reaffirm the obligations organisations must meet when
checking information. A code of practice for digital identity is one way to ensure
individuals are protected and organisations meet their privacy and transparency
requirements. A code of practice for using government attributes could be set out in the
trust framework or established in primary legislation.
23.Would a code of practice be helpful to ensure officials and organisations
understand how to correctly check information?
3.2.0.5 We are considering allowing for the onward transfer of government-confirmed
attributes. This would mean, for example, that if a person got their passport information
digitally checked once, this positive check could be reused later without the need to
reconfirm for a set period of time depending on the use case.
3.2.0.6 Of course, some data is time limited and some checks must be very time
limited, such as right to work checks, and so may require a new check. We believe it
should be for the data controllers to decide to what extent onward transfer should be
allowed, and for bodies that produce guidance for use cases, such as the Joint Money
Laundering Steering Group and the Disclosure and Barring Service,to determine what
checks are appropriate in their sector.
24.What are the advantages or disadvantages of allowing the onward transfer
of government-confirmed attributes, as set out?
4 Establishing the validity of digital
identities and attributes
4.0.0.1 In the response to the Call for Evidence, we undertook to remove any
unnecessary legal blockers to the use of digital identities and digital attributes. Just as
we are committed to not making digital identities compulsory in the UK, we want to
ensure that people are not forced to use traditional identity documents, if these are not
strictly required, because of historic guidance which requires physical features, such as
presentation of a holographic image.
The sale of alcohol (Licensing Act 2003) is a commonly cited blocker to digital
identity use. The Home Office is currently running regulatory sandbox trials of
age verification technology to find the most appropriate way forward in this
area.
4.1 Opportunities to enable the use of digital identities
4.1.0.1 Most current blockers to digital identity use are found in guidance rather than in
legislation. We believe that if digital identity products are overseen by a trusted
governance system and built on the solid foundation of authoritative government-held
data then then Departments whose business processes are predicated on identity
verification (examples of which are discussed in the following paragraphs) will feel
confident to update their guidance and remove these blockers. We will of course work
with those Departments to assist in this.
4.1.0.2 There are potential opportunities to enable the wider use of digital identities in
the Blockers include Disclosure & Barring Service (DBS) checksguidelines, which do
not currently allow for digital checking methods, and within the Home Office Rright to
Wwork and or rRight to Rrent Schemeschecks, where their system of checks can be
developed to enable the use of digital identities beyond their own internal services.the
Home Office’s statutory code of practices need to be updated to allow the full use of
digital identity.
4.1.0.3 The Home Office has already implemented digital checks in the Right to Work
and Right to Rent Schemes with the introduction of the Home Office online right to
work and right to rent checking services. These services allow an individual to prove
their right to work or rent digitally, by providing time limited access to the relevant
information. This includes the individual’s name and facial image and can therefore be
used for identity verification purposes. These services can be used by individuals who
have been given access to a digital version of their UK immigration status (an eVisa), or
those with a valid Biometric Residence Permit or Card.
4.1.0.4 The online services work on the basis of the individual first viewing their
information which is to be shared. The individual can then share service specific
information with the employer or landlord. The service is secure, free to use and enables
checks to be carried out remotely via video call as the information is provided in real
time directly from Home Office systems.
4.1.0.5 The Home Office is currently exploring options to allow digital right to work and
rent checks for those who are not in scope to use the online checking services, for
example British and Irish Nationals. However, the Home Office is clear any adopted
technologies must adhere to the security and integrity requirements of the Schemes.
The introduction of a governance and trust framework clearly presents opportunities in
this area.
4.1.0.3 From 21 June, right to work checks reverted from the COVID-19 adjusted
measures, to face-to-face, physical document checks for those who cannot use the
Home Office online checking service as set out in legislation and published guidance on
GOV.UK. The adjusted process allowed checks of physical documents to be undertaken
remotely, via video call, but was not an established digital solution. The Home Office is
keen to explore options for employers to undertake digital checks on those who are not
in scope to use the Home Office’s online checking service. The Home Office is currently
undertaking a review of the value of using specialist technology, including Identity
Document Validation technology, to support a system of digital right to work checks.
4.1.0.4 IWhile not blocker, in the financial services sector we are working to ensure
alignment with influential guidance such as that produced by the Joint Money
Laundering Steering Group and the Financial Action Task Force, to increase
organisation’s confidence in using digital identity verification methods.
4.2 Building confidence
4.2.0.1 As technology changes traditional non digital processes, there may be
corporate aversion to embracing new technologies. Some organisations are still
hesitant to use e-signatures, for example, despite a Law Commission report confirming
that they are as legally binding as wet signatures in the majority of circumstances.
4.2.0.2 To avoid this issue, we are proposing that we introduce a statutory presumption
affirming that digital identities and digital attributes can be as valid as physical forms of
identification or traditional identity documents.
4.2.0.3 In addition we plan to make it clear in legislation that government-held data
checked in digital form is equivalent to that currently provided in paper documentation,
like passports. However, as set out in the previous section, we do not intend that a
digital check should be the sole basis on which a service could be denied. That is, there
should be alternative methods for someone to prove their identity. It should be noted
that, for international travel, passports will still be required for the foreseeable future.
4.2.0.4 We believe that this measure, when combined with the other measures we are
consulting on, will give guidance and regulatory bodies the confidence required to
include digital identity solutions in their guidance, and give organisations more surety
about their use of digital identities.
25.Would it be helpful to affirm in legislation that digital identities and digital
attributes can be as valid as physical forms of identification, or traditional
identity documents?
Summary of questions
Creating a digital identity governance framework
1. Do you agree an existing regulator is best placed to house digital identity
governance, or should a new body be created?
2. Which regulator do you think should house digital identity governance?
3. What is your opinion on the governance functions we have identified as being
required: is anything missed or not needed, in your view?
4. What is your opinion on the governing body owning the trust framework as outlined,
and does the identity of the governing body affect your opinion?
5. Is there any other guidance that you propose could be incorporated into the trust
framework?
6. How do we fairly represent the interests of civil society and public and private sectors
when refreshing trust framework requirements?
7. Are there any other advisory groups that should be set up in addition to those
suggested?
8. How should the government ensure that any fees do not become a barrier to entry for
organisations while maintaining value for money for the taxpayer?
9. Do you agree with this two-layered approach to oversight where oversight is provided
by the governing body and scheme owners?
10. Do you agree the governing body should be an escalation point for complaints which
cannot be resolved at organisational or scheme level?
11. Do you think there needs to be additional redress routes for consumers using
products under the trust framework?
If yes, which one or more of the following?:
a. an ombudsman service
b. industry-led dispute resolution mechanism (encouraged or mandated)
c. set contract terms between organisations and consumers
d. something else
If no, do you think the governing body should reserve the right to impose an additional
route once the ecosystem is more fully developed?
12.Do you see any challenges to this approach of signposting to existing redress
pathways?
13.How should we enhance the ‘right to rectification’ for trust framework products and
services?
14.Should the governing body be granted any of the following additional enforcement
powers where there is non-compliance to trust framework requirements?
a. Monetary fines
b. Enforced compensation payments to affected consumers
c. Restricting processing and/or provision of digital identity services
d. Issue reprimand notices for minor offences with persistent reprimands requiring
further investigation
15.Should the governing body publish all enforcement action undertaken for
transparency and consumer awareness?
16.What framework-level fraud and security management initiatives should be put in
place?
17.How else can we encourage more inclusive digital identities?
18.What are the advantages and disadvantages with this exclusion report approach?
19.What would you expect the exclusion report to include?
Enabling a legal gateway between public and private sector organisations for data
checking
20.Should membership of the trust framework be a prerequisite for an organisation to
make eligibility or identity checks against government-held data?
21.Should a requirement to allow an alternative pathway for those who fail a digital
check be set out in legislation or by the governing body in standards?
22.Should disclosure be restricted to a “yes/no’’ answer or should we allow more
detailed responses if appropriate?
23.Would a code of practice be helpful to ensure officials and organisations understand
how to correctly check information?
24.What are the advantages or disadvantages of allowing the onward transfer of
government-confirmed attributes, as set out?
Establishing the validity of digital identities and attributes
25.Would it be helpful to affirm in legislation that digital identities and digital attributes
can be as valid as physical forms of identification, or traditional identity documents?
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